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I. INTRODUCTION
President Clinton signed into law the Telecommunications Act of 1996
(1996 Act or the Act) on February 8, 1996.1 The pen he used to sign the
Act was also used by President Eisenhower to create the federal highway
system in 1957 and was later given to Senator Albert Gore, Sr., the father
of the highway legislation. Clinton's gesture highlighted Vice President Al
Gore's eminence in telecommunications policy. It also related the 1996
Act's primary goal--to spur competition in the telephone and cable
industries-to its secondary consequences--the creation of new information
highways through liberalized and converged technologies. Ironically, the
1996 Act itself contained few provisions expressly designed to promote
* Ms. Goodman is an attorney in the Washington, D.C. office of Covington & Burling,
which represents broadcasters in digital television proceedings. The views expressed in this
article are solely the views of the author.
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (to be codified
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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emerging technologies to pave the information highway. Those provisions
concerning the nascent advanced digital broadcast television technology
(DTV)---the long-heralded twenty-first century broadcast television
system-were among the few crafted to serve this purpose.
The DTV provisions, set forth in section 201 of the 1996 Act (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 336), constitute only a small piece of the 1996 Act,
but they took on an importance disproportionate to their legal significance.
The provisions themselves do not alter the authority of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) to assign DTV licenses
as it could have done (and seemed inclined to do) anyway.
The significance of the provisions was magnified by the controversies
that swirled around and followed after their creation. The controversy over
auctioning spectrum was the most notable of these.' More generally, the
DTV provisions focused attention on the intensely disputed issue of how
spectrum should be assigned among various services and users, and what
the respective roles of the FCC and Congress should be. Discussions on this
second point arose during the deliberations leading to the 1996 Act and
extended into congressional hearings that followed the Act's enactment.
Thus far, Congress has decided that it will not go beyond the 1996 Act with
respect to DTV legislation and that the expert agency should conclude the
DTV proceeding on its own.4 This article will explore how that decision
was made and preview the repercussions of that decision on spectrum
management policy of the future.
2. In short, the DTV provisions simply provide that: (a) DTV licenses, if any, should
be assigned initially only to existing broadcasters; (b) DTV licensees should be permitted
to use their assigned channels flexibly so long as they do not interfere with advanced
television services, including high definition television; (c) DTV licensees should pay fees
for certain uses of the DTV channel; and (d) broadcasters should surrender one of their two
licenses at some point in the future. 47 U.S.C.A. § 336 (West Supp. 1996).
3. The radio spectrum is a conceptual tool used to organize the physical phenomena
of waves produced by electric and magnetic fields. These waves move through space at
different frequencies. The group of frequencies from 3000 cycles per second (3 kilohertz
(KHz)) to 300 billion cycles per second (300 gigahertz (GHz)) comprises what is known as
the radio spectrum. Television broadcasting operates at the low end of this spectrum,
between 54 megahertz (MHz) and 806 MHz, on channels 2-69 (each consisting of 6 MHz).
4. The FCC did conclude the DTV rulemaking on April 3, 1997 by adopting the Fifth
and Sixth Reports and Orders in the DTV proceeding. As of this writing, the texts of those
orders had not been released. See Federal Communications Commission, Commission Adopts
Rules for Digital Television Service (MM Docket No. 87-268), Report No. MM 97-8 (April
3,1997) <http://www.fcc.gov//Bureaus/Mass_Media/News._Releases/1997/nrmim7005.html>
[hereinafter DTV Rules]; Federal Communications Commission, Commission Adopts Table
ofAllotments for DTV; Establishes Policies and Rules (MM Docket No. 87-268), Report No.
MM 97-9 (April 3, 1997) <http://www.fcc.gov//Bureaus/Mass__Media/News__Releases/1 997/
nnnm7005.html> [hereinafter DTV Allotments].
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II. ORIGINS OF THE DTV PRovIsIoNs OF THE 1996 ACT
By February 1996, the FCC proceeding on DTV (previously referred
to as ATV or Advanced Television Services) was almost nine years old and
Congress, with the 1996 Act, was inserting itself into a mature regulatory
process nearing completion. As discussed below, the FCC tentatively had
decided to assign to each of the more than 1600 existing television
broadcast stations a second 6 megahertz (MHz) channel (the standard
bandwidth for North American television) to begin broadcasting DTV
signals. Broadcasters would have six years from the issuance of a DTV
license to construct a second station and get a DTV signal on the air. In
approximately fifteen years, with the presumably widespread penetration of
digital sets in the home, the analog service would be discontinued, and
broadcasters would revert to a single 6 MHz channel.' What the FCC had
not considered in any detail was the use of auctions to assign the DTV
channels. In fact, the FCC did not have the authority to use auctions to
assign any licenses until 1994 and, even after 1994, the FCC lacked the
authority to assign broadcast licenses by auction. But there were other
reasons too few seriously considered DTV auctions. Until the congressional
debates over the 1996 Act, the DTV transition was viewed as a necessary
and expensive technical upgrade to be soldiered through, not a coveted prize
to be bid for. The congressional debates of 1994 and 1995 changed this.
Not only did these debates raise the prospect of an enlarged FCC auction
authority, but they also altered the public's perception of what the transition
to DTV might mean.
A. The Regulatory Process
By the late 1970s, it had become apparent to many broadcasters that
the existing broadcast technology, developed in the 1930s, would have to
be updated. This existing technology, known as "NTSC",6 was an analog
transmission system that had been adapted to accommodate color and
stereo, but was unlikely to support additional significant improvements in
5. See In re Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing
Television Broadcast Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 6924, paras.
16-28, 71 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 375 (1992) [hereinafter ATV Memorandum Opinion and
Order]. In the rules it adopted on April 3, 1997, the FCC set an eight-year transition
schedule set to conclude in 2008. See DTV Rules, supra note 4.
6. This system is named for the National Television System Committee, an industry
group that developed the monochrome television standard in 1940-41 and the color television
standard in 1950-53. See generally Denise Ulloa, Advanced Television Systems: A
Reexamination of Broadcasters' Use of the Spectrum From a Twenty-First Century
Perspective, 16 WHrrrm L. REv. 1155, 1161 (1995).
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picture and sound. On the horizon was high definition television (HDTV)
which would permit the transmission of pictures with wider dimensions and
much better definition. The difficulty was that the decentralized nature of
broadcast television, transmitted from more than 1600 local stations to more
than 200 million sets, made a system-wide upgrade extremely complicated.
The question was how, all at relatively the same time, each of these local
stations could convert its facilities to a new technology, the television
networks and program syndicators could provide compatible new program-
ming, and consumers could purchase new sets. In addition, the question was
how this technical and logistical feat could be accomplished without
disrupting the existing broadcast system serving more than 98 percent of the
public--the system that functioned as the nation's video dialtone.
In 1987, a group of broadcasters petitioned the FCC to begin
answering these questions by opening an inquiry on how to upgrade the
nation's broadcast television service.7 That same year broadcasters
sponsored a demonstration of HDTV in Washington.' By this time
Japanese and European entities (generally government-backed) were well on
their way to implementing HDTV technology and exporting that technology
to the United States. The Japanese government-supported Nippon Hoso
Kuyokai (NHK) broadcasting company had proposed an analog HDTV
system for use in the United States. From a technical perspective, this
system was ill-suited to the locally based, relatively narrowband U.S.
broadcasting system.9 Perhaps more importantly the prospect of both
7. A provocative perspective on this early history and on the subsequent development
of DTV policy and technology appears in JOEL BRINKLEY, DEFINING VISION: THE BATTLE
FOR THE FUTURE OF TELEVISION (1997). Essentially, Brinkley argues that American
broadcasters, led by the National Association of Broadcasters, seized on advanced television
as a way to prevent the reallocation of UHF broadcast channels-channels that would be
needed to implement advanced television-to the land of mobile service in 1987.
8. This demonstration was part of the first congressional hearing on HDTV on October
8, 1987. High Definition Television: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunica-
tions and Finance of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, 100th Cong. (1989)
[hereinafter HDTV Hearings]. Forward-looking broadcasters had fixed on the need to
upgrade the television system years earlier. For example, the chairman of the Association
for Maximum Service Television had testified before Congress in 1981 on the need to
preserve spectrum for the future broadcast of HDTV. Satellite Communications/Direct
Broadcast Satellites: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Consumer Protection, and
Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. at 81-106 (1981) (statement
of testimony by Wallace J. Jorgenson, President, Jefferson-Pilot Broadcasting Co. and
Chairman of MST).
9. The NHK system originally was designed for the wider channels used in Europe and
Japan, rather than the 6 MHz channels used in North America. In addition, the NHK system
was developed for a satellite-only system of delivery, rather than for terrestrial broadcasts.
For a description of the NHK and other early advanced television systems, see In re
Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing Television Broadcast
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transmission and receiver technologies developed abroad was untenable
from a domestic policy perspective. 0
Thus, the FCC launched a proceeding in 1987 with the goal of
improving the sound and picture of the nation's broadcast system and
spurring American industry to develop an HDTV system.1 To this end,
the FCC established the Advisory Committee on Advanced Television
Service (ACATS)-a joint government and private industry group, chaired
by former FCC Chairman Richard Wiley, and charged to work under the
FCC's direction to evaluate candidate transmission systems and to
recommend a national DTV standard.
In 1988, testing of more than twenty-three advanced television system
prototypes began at the Advanced Television Test Center (Test Center),
based in Alexandria, Virginia.' 2 Most of the prototypes were analog
systems. Then, in 1990, the FCC made a decision that shaped how the
ACATS process would progress. 3 It announced that advanced television
signals would have to be broadcast simultaneously with conventional NTSC
signals.'4 As a result of this "simulcasting approach," either additional
spectrum outside the broadcast band would be necessary to transmit
advanced television or advanced television systems would have to use
spectrum already allocated for broadcast service. ' "
Not surprisingly, given the increasing competition for available
spectrum, the latter course prevailed. Because television stations are
assigned so as to minimize interference from stations in different markets
on the same channel and stations in the same market on adjacent channels,
Service, Notice of Inquiry, 2 FCC Rcd. 5125 (1987) [hereinafter ATV Notice of Inquiry]; In
re Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing Television Broadcast
Service, Tentative Decision and Further Notice of Inquiry, 3 FCC Rcd. 6520, paras. 15-39,
65 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 295 (1988).
10. HDTVHearings, supra note 8, at 187 (Remarks of Rep. Markey) ("[T]he only point
that I was trying to make ... was that American manufacturers should have been doing
what the Japanese have been doing over the last generation. I make no pre-judgment as to
what we are to be doing in the country with regard to the introduction of these new systems
other than that it has been a sad commentary upon the American manufacturers and it is
clearly time for us to begin taking a close, hard look as to what the long-term implications
will be for our country.")
11. See ATVNotice of Inquiry, 2 FCC Rcd. 5125, paras. 2-3 (1987).
12. The Test Center was funded initially by the major television networks and trade
associations, and later, also, by the Electronic Industries Association.
13. For a good description of the ACATS process, see generally Richard E. Wiley, The
Challenge of Choice, 47 FED. CoMM. L.J. 401 (1994).
14. See In re Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing Broadcast
Service, First Report and Order, 5 FCC Rcd. 5627, para. 7, 68 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 163
(1990) ("[c]onsistent with our goal of ensuring excellence in ATV service, we intend to
select a simulcast high definition system.").
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a number of channels in each market are unusable. The challenge facing the
FCC and designers of advanced television systems in the early 1990s was
to fit another 1600 stations into these buffer channels without creating
unacceptable interference to analog stations. Only digital systems could
meet this challenge because only digital signals are robust enough to be
transmitted between analog signals without deteriorating or causing
unacceptable interference to the surrounding analog channels.
In 1992, the General Instrument Corporation proposed to ACATS the
first all-digital HDTV transmission system that was compatible with the
existing television channel scheme. This system, and others that followed,
had three distinct advantages over the competing analog systems. First, as
noted above, the digital systems could facilitate the efficient use of the
existing broadcast spectrum by rendering the buffer and "taboo" channels
usable for the first time. Second, the use of digital compression technology
enabled DTV channels to carry five times the information that can fit into
analog channels of the same size. Third, digital television promised
competitive advantages that could carry over-the-air broadcasting into the
next century. As Congressman Markey (D-Mass.) stated in 1996, "[I]t's in
the broadcast industry's long-term interest to go digital. .. . The phone,
cable, wireless and satellite industries are all moving to digital technology.
Digital technology is the equivalent of 'technological Esperanto.. ' .15
Digital's clear advantages were reflected in the ACATS testing process in
which just two analog and four digital advanced television systems
progressed. In mid-1993, pursuant to an ACATS recommendation, the seven
companies that had been proponents of the four digital systems joined in a
"Grand Alliance" to create the optimal DTV system.1 6
The Grand Alliance designed its system with several goals in mind. 7
First, as a result of FCC directives, it aimed to transmit HDTV within the
existing broadcast spectrum, over 6 MHz channels and with minimum
interference to NTSC transmissions. Second, recognizing the increasing
15. Fate ofHDTV Is Now in Lawmakers'Hands, ELECTRONIC ENG'G TIMES, Mar. 25,
1996, at 1.
16. See FCC Advisory Committee on Advanced Television Service, ATV System
Recommendation (Feb. 24, 1993) available at <http://www.atsc.org/papers/atvreportl>. The
members of the Grand Alliance are AT&T (now Lucent), David Sarnoff Research Center,
General Instrument Corporation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Philips Electronics
North America Corporation, Thomson Consumer Electronics, and Zenith Electronics
Corporation.
17. A technical review of the Grand Alliance system is provided in R. Hopkins, Digital
Terrestrial HDTVfor North America: The Grand Alliance HDTV System, EBU TECHNICAL
REVIEW, Summer 1994. See also In re Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon
the Existing Broadcast Service, Fifth Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 11 FCC Rcd.
6235, para. 1 (1996) [hereinafter A TV Fifth Further Notice].
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prevalence of computer interfaces, it sought to make DTV broadcasting
interoperable with computer (supporting the adoption of square pixel and
progressive scan formats) and ATM applications (supporting the adoption
of data packet formats). The result was a system that could make use of the
buffer channels in the existing broadcast spectrum to produce a television
picture that rivaled film for clarity and vividness. HDTV has a resolution
of more than 1000 lines (an increase from 525 lines on NTSC), a wide
aspect ratio of 16 inches by 9 inches (an increase from 4:3 on NTSC), and
CD-quality sound.'8 Testing of the Grand Alliance system proceeded at the
Test Center through 1994 and well into 1995. In November 1995, ACATS
delivered its final report to the FCC recommending the adoption of a DTV
transmission standard based on the Grand Alliance system. 19
The advent of a digital system for DTV delivery was the single most
important technical development in the decade-long pursuit of advanced
television. It meant that the broadcast channel would no longer be limited
to one stream of programming, but could become a pipe for an array of bits
just like wire or cable. As a result, DTV could be used flexibly to transmit
a single HDTV program, as many as five programs of lesser resolution
(therefore requiring fewer bits and a narrower bandwidth), or a combination
of broadcast programming and data. The system would also permit the
opportunistic use of the bitstream so that a channel mostly devoted to
HDTV could still be used simultaneously to transmit data on the unused
portions of the channel.2" As discussed below, it was the desire of
broadcasters to employ this flexibility that brought DTV issues to
Congress's attention in 1994. Similarly, it was the prospect of flexible use
18. See ATVFiflh Further Notice, 11 FCC Rcd. 6235, paras. 6-13.
19. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMIssION ADVISORY COMMTrEE ON
ADVANCED TELEVISION SERVICE, ADVISORY COMMITrEE FINAL REPORT AND RECOM-
MENDATION (1995) [hereinafter ACATS REPORT]. The FCC adopted the majority of the
recommended standard. Largely because of dissent from within the computer industry, the
FCC did not adopt the picture formats. Thus, broadcasters may choose the aspect ratio and
scanning formats as these specifications are not included in the adopted standard. See In re
Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing Television Broadcast
Service, Fourth Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 17,771, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 963 (1996)
[hereinafter ATV Fourth Report and Order].
20. See In re Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing
Television Broadcast Service, Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Third
Notice of Inquiry, 10 FCC Rcd. 10,540, para. 10 (1995) [hereinafter ATV Fourth Further
Notice]; see also Remarks of FCC Chairman Hundt before the International Radio and
Television Society (Nov. 21, 1995) ("[The Grand Alliance] has discovered a wondrous
digital genie in a bottle. With it you can broadcast multiple signals of higher resolution than
today's NTSC signal, or dozens of audio signal, or software packages, or thousands of pages
of text, or a pair of very high resolution movies."). See generally Kevin Maney, Going
Digital Means Sharper Boob Tubes, USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 1997, at B1.
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
that increased the pressure on the FCC and Congress to auction the DTV
spectrum.
In the regulatory arena, of equal importance to the development of the
digital technology, was the FCC's tentative decision in 1992 to limit initial
eligibility for the advanced television licenses to existing broadcasters--that
is, broadcasters who had applied for, or received, analog broadcast licenses
as of that date.2 Behind this decision was an important notion that was to
become a cornerstone of broadcasters' arguments in later spectrum battles.
This was that DTV would not, strictly speaking, constitute a "new" service.
Rather, it would revamp and supplant the public's existing broadcast service
and ensure that broadcast television remained a viable option for those who
could not or would not pay for subscription video services. In the early
1990s, it was clear that free over-the-air television was competing against
increasing cable penetration and wireless technologies. But whereas
companies providing these subscription services could upgrade their
technologies at will, broadcasters could do little without FCC approval.
Operating a decentralized service easily degraded by interference on
government-regulated airwaves and lacking any ability to control the
receiving end of their systems (i.e., the television sets), broadcasters could
only upgrade in a coordinated, industry-wide fashion.
In 1994, when the regulatory process slowed to allow the DTV system
testing process to conclude, the FCC seemed poised to permit this industry-
wide upgrade. The FCC would loan existing broadcasters second 6 MHz
channels on which to introduce the new DTV service. Broadcasters would
be expected to build DTV stations by installing new transmission equipment
and often constructing new towers and studios. They would have to
simulcast DTV and NTSC programming for fifteen years until, presumably,
DTV would have achieved sufficiently high penetration levels to warrant
discontinuance of the NTSC service. Because the new digital channels could
be accommodated within about 60 percent of the spectrum currently
allocated to television broadcasting, the DTV channels would be "repacked"
at the end of the transition into a narrower band. As a result, large
21. See In re Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing
Television Broadcast Service, Second Report & Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 3340, para. 2, 70 Rad.
Reg. 2d. (P & F) 1102 (1992) [hereinafter ATV Second Report & Order, see also In re
Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing Television Broadcast
Service, Sixth Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 11 FCC Rcd. 10,968, para. 9 (1996)
[hereinafter ATV Sixth Further Notice] which proposed to permit new applicants to obtain
DTV licenses on a case-by-case basis. The 1996 Act apparently codified this tentative
decision, although, on its face, the legislation appears to expand the pool of eligible
broadcasters to those existing (either permitted or operational) as of the date that DTV
licenses are assigned. 47 U.S.C.A. § 336(a) (West Supp. 1996).
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contiguous blocks of spectrum estimated between 130 and 150 MHz of
spectrum would be available for reallocation after the fifteen-year transition
period. Broadcasters were in basic agreement with this plan.23
What sort of programs broadcasters could (or must) transmit on the
DTV channels was unclear, although the FCC was considering strict
requirements that broadcasters simulcast a high percentage of their analog
programming on the digital channel.24 Spectrum auctions, which were
conducted for the first time for any service in 1994, were not then seriously
contemplated for television broadcasting. Thus, when legislative debate
swelled in 1994, the controversy was largely over what content the DTV
channels would carry, and not over how those channels would be licensed.
This would change abruptly in 1995 as Congress found itself sifting through
the esoteric and highly technical issue of spectrum management.
B. The First Bills
Although the first bills explicitly containing DTV provisions were
introduced in late 1993, unrelated legislation passed earlier that year would
have tremendous impact on congressional consideration of DTV. That
legislation, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA), for
the first time authorized the FCC to use auctions, rather than administrative
proceedings and lotteries, to assign initial rights to radio spectrum.25 Under
OBRA, spectrum auctions are limited to situations in which "mutually
exclusive applications are accepted for filing"'26 and "the principal use of
such spectrum will involve, or is reasonably likely to involve, the licensee
22. ATV Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 6924, para. 75, 71 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 375 (1992) (stating that the goal of the transition was "to permit the viewing
public to make a nondisruptive transition to ATV and allow the reclamation of the second
channel after that transition is complete"). The FCC ultimately settled on the recapture of
138 Mhz. See DTV Rules, supra note 4.
23. See, e.g., Joint Broadcaster Comments to the ATV Fourth Further Notice in MM
Dkt. No. 87-268 (Nov. 20, 1995).
24. ATV Second Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 3340, para. 57, 70 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 1102 (1992). The FCC later reopened this issue because it came to believe that the market
would serve consumer demand by assuring the continued presence of good programming on
NTSC channels. See ATV Fourth Further Notice, 10 FCC Rcd. 10,540, paras. 40-41 (1995).
In the rules it adopted on April 3, 1997, the FCC decided against any simulcasting
requirement until the last few years of the transition. It also rejected any HDTV minimum
programming requirement. See HDTV Rules, supra note 4.
25. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 6001-6003,
107 Stat. 312, 379 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 3090)). The FCC's auction authority, pursuant
to OBRA, is set to expire in 1998.
26. 47 U.S.C. § 3090)(1) (1994).
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receiving compensation from subscribers."27 OBRA thus did not give the
FCC authority to auction advertiser-supported broadcast licenses. It also
prohibited the agency from making spectrum assignment decisions in order
to garner auction revenues so that the FCC would have to stick to its
mission of managing spectrum, not raising revenue.28
Notwithstanding these restrictions, OBRA provided the FCC with the
means to deliver to the Treasury almost 18 billion dollars in auction
revenues by 1996, the largest part of which came from auctioning spectrum
for Personal Communication Services (PCS).29 The size of this revenue
stream loomed large in the DTV debates, especially when Congress began
to focus on the flexible capabilities of the DTV system to provide
subscription services akin to the services provided on spectrum that the FCC
was already auctioning. Since television broadcasting operates on 402 MHz
of spectrum in the desirable 54-806 MHz range, it is not surprising that the
temptation to wring auction revenue from the broadcast spectrum was
intense.
Congress first took up DTV broadcasting in Commerce Committees
that focused not on spectrum auctions, but on the proper use of the DTV
channel. As auction issues became more prominent in 1995, however, the
legislative impulse moved to the Budget Committees where it was the line-
item of auction revenues that drove policy.
1. The Commerce Committee Bills
Momentum towards major telecommunications legislation started in
late-1993 and comprehensive telecommunications legislation containing
DTV provisions had moved out of both Senate and House Commerce
Committees by the first half of 1994. The vehicles for these provisions,
ultimately similar in both the House and Senate, were H.R. 3636, intro-
27. 47 U.S.C. § 309 U)(2)(A) (1994). This language emerged from the Conference where
it was decided to restrict competitive bidding to a limited number of types of licenses. See
H.R. REP. No. 103-213, at 481 (1993).
28. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(7)(A) (1994).
29. In testimony before the Senate Budget Committee, a Congressional Budget Office
analyst testified that the PCS auctions would ultimately yield $18 billion. See Hearing on
Budgetary and Economic Implications of Alternative Spectrum Use Policies Before the
Senate Budget Committee, 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter Senate Budget Hearings]
(statement of David Moore, Senior Analyst, Congressional Budget Office); see also Federal
Management of the Radio Spectrum: Advanced Television Services: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th
Cong. (1996) [hereinafter Management of Radio Spectrum Hearings] (testimony of David
H. Moore, Senior Analyst, Congressional Budget Office). The total has since climbed to $24
billion, although a significant fraction of that total has not been collected. Mark Landler,
Airwave Auctions Falter as Source of Funds for U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1997, at Al.
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duced by Representative Markey (D-Mass.),31 then Chairman of the House
Telecommunications Subcommittee, and S. 1822, introduced by Senator
Hollings (D-S.C.), then Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee.31
DTV provisions in each bill permitted broadcasters to use the DTV channels
for nonbroadcast and generally subscription-supported "ancillary and
supplementary" services such as data transmission, so long as broadcasters
paid a reasonable spectrum fee to the extent that they provided subscription
services.32 Although similar provisions developed in both legislative
chambers, it was on the House side that this notion of spectrum flexibility
proved particularly controversial.
At the urging of broadcasters, Representative Tauzin (R-La.) first
offered a "flexible use" amendment to H.R. 3636 in March 1994. This
amendment proposed to allow television broadcasters to use their NTSC and
DTV channels to provide ancillary and supplementary services.33 The
practical impact of this legislation with respect to use of the television
channels was unclear. In fact, broadcasters had long been permitted to use
their NTSC channels at least somewhat flexibly, although subscription
businesses had never proved viable.34 In addition, there was no indication
30. The National Communications Competition and Information Infrastructure Act of
1994, H.R. 3636, 103d Cong. (1993). A bill dealing with related issues, the Antitrust and
Communications Reform Act of 1994, was introduced in the Judiciary Committee the same
day by Representative Brooks (D-Tex.). H.R. 3626, 103d Cong. (1993).
31. The Communications Act of 1994, S. 1822, 103d Cong.
32. The DTV provisions of H.R. 3636 are discussed below. Section 702 of S. 1822,
provided that if the FCC issues DTV licenses to existing broadcasters, it should permit
broadcasters to transmit ancillary and supplementary services
so long as the licensees provide without charge to the public, at least one advanced
television program service as prescribed by the Commission that is intended for
and available to the general public on the advanced television spectrum .... In
determining the amount of such fees, the Commission shall take into account the
portion of the licensee's total spectrum which is used for such services and the
amount of time such services are provided.
S. 1822, § 702.
According to the Senate Commerce Committee Report, S. Rep. No. 103-367, at 100
(1994), the FCC should "strongly consider establishing" fees equal to auction revenues for
similar services. The Report cautioned that, "[A]t the same time, the FCC should also make
note of the fact that television licenses are assigned for limited terms of 5 years, compared
to what may be licenses of indefinite terms assigned through competitive bidding. Licensees
will use only a portion of their assigned spectrum to provide ancillary and supplementary
services, and for only limited times of the day." Id.
33. Like S. 1822, the amendment also required payment of a reasonable fee (comparable
to auction fees) for spectrum used to transmit commercial nonbroadcast services.
34. For instance, broadcasters have been permitted to use the "vertical blanking interval"
of the 6 MHz channel to transmit nonbroadcast programming, including subscriptions. See
In re Amendment of Parts 2, 73, and 76 of the Commission's Rules to- Authorize the
Offering of Data Transmission Services on the Vertical Blanking Interval by TV Stations,
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that the FCC was going to prevent broadcasters from using the DTV
channel flexibly to the full extent of the Grand Alliance system's capabili-
ties so long as they provided a digital broadcast service and, possibly, some
HDTV. Thus, H.R. 3636 was designed to make mandatory the flexibility
that was already permitted with respect to NTSC channels and that probably
would have been permitted under the existing FCC proposal with respect
to the DTV channels. 5
Increasing interest in spectrum auctions prompted strong objections to
the flexible-use amendment by then Commerce Committee Chairman
Dingell (D-Mich.), Representative Boucher (D-Va.), and others. They
contended that the spectrum flexibility proposal would reduce the revenue
that the government could raise in pending PCS auctions by permitting
broadcasters to offer PCS-like services without the burden of spectrum
auction fees. 36 Representative Tauzin withdrew his amendment to H.R. -
3636 in the face of this opposition.3 7
The amendment, however, set off an inquiry that stirred additional
opposition to the flexibility proposal. Representatives Dingell and Markey
submitted questions to the FCC, the Commerce Department's National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), the Office of
Management Budget (OMB), and industry representatives, asking how the
flexibility proposal would affect HDTV development, how it would affect
planned spectrum auctions for other services, whether broadcasters should
be permitted to use spectrum for nonbroadcast services, how broadcasters'
public interest obligations would be affected, and how minority ownership
would be affected.3"
Broadcasters expressed their support for the amendment.39 PCS and
Report and Order, 101 F.C.C.2d 973, para. 2-3, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 832 (1985).
35. In fact, the ATV Fourth Further Notice indicated an inclination to permit flexible
use of the DTV channel and requested comment on the degree of flexibility that should be
permitted. ATV Fourth Further Notice, 10 FCC Rcd. 10,540, para. 23 (1995). The
Commission ultimately allowed broadcasters to use the DTV channel flexibly so long as they
maintained one channel of free broadcast programming on the DTV channel. See DTVRules,
supra note 4.
36. See Peter Lambert, Comcast, MCI, Nextel Form National PCS Alliance, MULTI-
CHANNEL NEWS, Mar. 7, 1994, at 1.
37. See Telemedia Watch, BRDCST. & CABLE, Mar. 7, 1994, at 10.
38. See Markey Outlines Broadcast Spectrum Concerns, COMM. DAILY, Mar. 10, 1994,
at 1.
39. The broadcast industry, represented by the National Association of Broadcasters,
responded that it "should not be precluded from bringing valuable services to the public...
that may augment their revenues so as to provide the best possible over-the-air service."
Some broadcasters made the further point, understood by few, that a channel used to provide
HDTV had extra capacity only at certain times and could not be divided for use by other
licensees if HDTV was to be a commercially viable service capable of reaching a mass
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other potential competitors objected.4" The Chairman of the FCC, Reed
Hundt, wrote to Representative Markey that the FCC was the proper forum
for resolving the questions Markey had raised in the ongoing DTV
proceeding: "[Flor these reasons, we are of the view that as Congress
considers the amendment, it should preserve the Commission's present
ability to conduct a thorough review, which affords an opportunity to those
affected to delineate, balance and weigh the many factors and implications
and to advocate the proper resolution."'41
Following this exchange, Representative Tauzin returned with an
amendment quadrupled in size for consideration by the full Commerce
Committee. To counter-balance the spectrum flexibility provisions, the new
amendment contained provisions requiring broadcasters to return either the
NTSC or DTV channel when the transition to digital television was
complete. The Committee adopted the amendment. Thus, section 204 of
H.R. 3636, which was largely carried into the 1996 Act, provided that:
If the Commission determines to issue additional licenses for advanced
television services, and initially limits the eligibility for such licenses
to persons that, as of the date of such issuance, are licensed to operate
audience. See Bashed in Comments to Hill on Spectrum Flexibility, COMM. DAILY, Mar. 9,
1994, at 2.
40. The Personal Communications Industry Association and others in the business of
providing subscription wireless services objected that broadcasters' entry into their
businesses, without the burden of auctions, would be unfair and deleterious. The other major
industry group to be heard from was the equipment manufacturing community, which had
played a large role in the development of HDTV technology. For example, General
Instrument Corporation commented that spectrum should not be made available for any
purpose other than HDTV except on a comparative licensing or auction basis. See id. In
comments filed Nov. 20, 1995 to the ATV Fourth Further Notice, consumer equipment
manufacturers urged that the FCC require a certain amount of HDTV programming, but also
supported flexible use of the DTV channel. See Comments of the Grand Alliance to the ATV
Fourth Further Notice in MM Dkt. 87-268, at 4 (Nov. 20, 1995) (urging HDTV minimums
and flexible use); Comments of General Instrument Corporation to the ATV Fourth Further
Notice in MM Dkt. 87-268, at 6, 19-20 (Nov. 20, 1995) (advocating HDTV minimums,
flexible use, and mandatory carriage for some DTV programming); Comments of Thomson
to the ATV Fourth Further Notice in MM Dkt. 87-268, at 4 (Nov. 20, 1995) (urging HDTV
minimums and flexible use), and Comments of Zenith to the ATV Fourth Further Notice in
MM Dkt. 87-268, at 3, 5 (Nov. 20, 1995) (advocating HDTV minimums). Cable industry
commenters proposed that, if flexible use was permitted, cable should not have to carry any
more than a single stream of broadcast programming. See Comments of InterMedia to the
ATV Fourth Further Notice in MM Dkt. 87-268, at 4-5 (Nov. 20, 1995); Comments of
National Cable Television Association to the ATV Fourth Further Notice in MM Dkt. 87-
268, at 2-16 (Nov. 20, 1995); Comments of Tele-Communications, Inc. to the ATVFourth
Further Notice in MM Dkt. 87-268, at 5-19 (Nov. 20, 1995); and Comments of Turner
Broadcasting System to the ATV Fourth Further Notice in MM Dkt. 87-268, at 2-6 (Nov.
20, 1995).
41. FCCAsks Congress Not to Disturb HDTVDeliberations, 14 COMM. DAILY, Mar. 15,
1994, at 1.
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a television broadcast station or hold a permit to construct such a
station (or both), the Commission shall adopt regulations that allow
such licensees or permittees to offer such ancillary or supplementary
services on designated frequencies as may be consistent with the public
interest, convenience, and necessity.42
According to the House Commerce Committee Report, "permitting
broadcasters more flexibility in using their spectrum assignments is
consistent with the public policy goal of providing additional services to the
public. Such a policy not only promotes more efficient spectrum use, but
also encourages innovation.'" Broadcasters had argued that it was
impossible to divide the 6 MHz channel and still provide for the transmis-
sion of HDTV and that, therefore, denying them the opportunity to use the
channel's excess capacity to provide supplementary services would deprive
the public of such services altogether. The Committee took this argument
to heart and based the grant of permission to offer ancillary and supplemen-
tary services on the assumption that such services would be offered on a
frequency that was "indivisible" from the frequency used for DTV.
To address the concerns of the PCS community, the legislation
required broadcasters to pay the fair market value of the spectrum used to
transmit commercial nonbroadcast services." It also provided for the
eventual recovery of one of the two licenses by stipulating that the FCC
"shall . . . require that . . . either the additional license or the original
license held by the licensee be surrendered to the Commission."4 This
would take place when "the substantial majority of the public have obtained
television receivers that are capable of receiving advanced television
services" and should not "require the cessation of the broadcasting if such
42. H.R. 3636, § 204, 103d Cong. (1993).
43. H.R. REp. No. 103-560, at 87 (1994). The Committee Report also stated that the
flexible use provision "in no way precludes the Commission's decision-making in developing
standards and requirements for advanced television services." Id. Congress later, by way of
Sen. Pressler's draft "Grand Spectrum Bill" entitled the "Electro-Magnetic Spectrum
Management Policy Reform and Privatization Act" circulated on May 9, 1996, took up the
question of whether it did in fact want to constrain the power of the FCC to set standards.
The Grand Spectrum Bill, which was never introduced, would have expanded the FCC's
authority to auction spectrum and make it permanent, allowed flexible use of all spectrum,
and required broadcast licensees to pay down a deposit for each year of use of the DTV
channel up to 15 years when the broadcaster would give back one of two channels for return
of deposit (without interest) or forfeit 20% of deposit for each year's delay. It would also
have prevented the FCC from adoptifig a DTV technical standard.
44. See H.R. REP. No. 103-560, § 204(d), at 21; see also id. at 88 ("The Committee
intends that the Commission establish fees which are, to the maximum extent feasible, equal
to the amount the public would have received had the spectrum for such services been
auctioned publicly under section 3090)").
45. See H.R. REP. No. 103-560, § 204(c)(1), at 21.
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cessation would render the television receivers of a substantial portion of
the public useless, or otherwise cause undue burdens on the owners of such
,,46television receivers.
Notwithstanding the allowance for flexible use of the spectrum, the bill
was not intended to stand in the way of regulations designed to ensure the
delivery of HDTV. The Commission was instructed to "adopt such technical
and other requirements as may be necessary or appropriate to assure the
quality of the signal used to provide advanced television services, including
regulations that stipulate the minimum number of hours per day that such
signal must be transmitted."47 H.R. 3636, as amended, was adopted by the
full Commerce Committee in mid-March and the full House in June 1994
by a vote of 423-4.
The Senate failed to approve legislation in 1994, however, and the
process began anew in 1995 in a Republican-controlled Congress. In
March 1995, Senator Pressler (R-S.D.) (then Chairman of the Senate
Commerce Committee) introduced to the Senate S. 652, the Telecommuni-
cations Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995, which passed by an
eighty-one to eighteen vote on June 15, 1995.48 Section 201 contained
broadcast spectrum flexibility provisions that were very similar to those of
predecessor bills. They gave the FCC discretion as to whether it would
assign the DTV spectrum to existing broadcast licensees, but required the
46. See H.R. REP. No. 103-560, § 204(c)(2), at 21. According to the Committee Report,
"[tihis provision is designed to ensure that licensees' use of 12 MHz would be for temporary
simulcast purposes only, and that in due course one of the licensed channels revert to the
Commission. It also requires that the Commission must base its decision regarding the
surrender of the license on public acceptance of the new technology or on potential loss of
reception for a substantial portion of the public."
47. H.R. REP. No. 103-560, § 204(b)(5), at 20-21. The Committee Report provided that
the "Commission should set reasonable minimum hours standards reflecting current
reasonable expectations by consumers for the availability of television service. The
Committee recognizes that, particularly at the inception of ATV services, there may not be
a sufficient supply of ATV programming to permit full service. The Committee recognizes
that it may be appropriate for the Commission to establish a requirement that increased as
the supply of programming increases." H.R. REP. No. 103-560, at 88. Later, Chairman
Hundt signalled a rejection of this approach, see Speech of Chairman Reed Hundt to the
International Radio and Television Society (Oct. 18, 1996); see also Speech of Chairman
Reed Hundt Before the National Assoc. of Broadcasters Leadership Conference (Feb. 24,
1997), and the Commission ultimately declined to adopt mandatory HDTV minimums. See
HDTV Rules, supra note 4.
48. S. 652, 104th Cong., 141 CONG. REc. S8417 (daily ed. June 15, 1995) (enacted).
For debates, see 141 CONG. REC. S8422-58, S8460-80 (daily ed. June 15, 1995); 141 CONG.
REc. S8305-76, S8379, S8413-15 (daily ed. June 14, 1995); 141 CONG. REc. S8206-54
(daily ed. June 13, 1995); 141 CoNG. REc. S8134-76, S88-98 (daily ed. June 12, 1995); 141
CONG. REc. S8055-58, S8061-77, S8085 (daily ed. June 9, 1995); 141 CONG. REc. S7942-
8019 (daily ed. June 8, 1995); and 141 CONG. REc. S7881-7912 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
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FCC to allow licensees to make use of the DTV spectrum for "ancillary and
supplementary services" if the licensee provided at least one free advanced
television program service.49 Significantly, the Senate bill did not mandate
that the FCC limit initial eligibility for DTV licenses to existing broadcast-
ers, but only stated that the FCC "should" do so. While providing for the
recovery of one license, the Senate bill did not specify when this recovery
should occur.50
In August 1995, the House passed, by a vote of 305 to 117, the
"Communications Act of 1995" (H.R. 1555)."' Unlike the Senate bill,
section 301 of the House version compelled the FCC to assign the DTV
spectrum to incumbent broadcasters if it assigned any DTV channels.
5 2
Like the Senate bill, H.R. 1555 permitted flexible use of the DTV channel
and required the FCC to charge broadcasters for ancillary and supplementa-
ry subscription services. But unlike the Senate bill, H.R. 1555 expressly
required broadcasters to surrender one of the two licenses on a date to be
determined by the FCC on a market-by-market basis.13 In setting this date,
the FCC would have been required to consider whether: (1) the substantial
majority of the public has television sets capable of receiving digital
transmissions, and (2) the cessation of analog broadcasting would render
obsolete the television receivers of a substantial portion of the public.
The Senate and House bills were held up in the conference committee
for about five months through the fall and early winter of 1996. To
reconcile the two bills, House Amendment 301 would have required the
FCC to limit DTV licenses to existing broadcasters and to condition the
license on return of one of the two channels after the transition to DTV. It
also would have required that any license surrendered be reassigned through
competitive bidding. The conference agreement adopted the House
49. S. 652, 104th Cong., § 206(a)(1)(A) (1995). The Senate bill also required
broadcasters to pay a fee for any services delivered over existing or new spectrum for which
they charge a subscription fee. The FCC was required to set these fees by taking into
account the portion of the spectrum used for such services and the amount of time such
services were provided. The fee could not exceed the amount paid by bidders to competing
services in FCC auctions.
50. See also S. REP. No. 104-23, at 35-36 (1995).
51. H.R. 1555, 104th Cong., 141 CONG. REc. D992 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (enacted);
see also H. R. REP. No. 204, 104th Cong., pt. 1, at 1 (1995). This bill, introduced on May
3, 1995 by Rep. Bliley, slightly altered the thrust of H.R. 3636 although it maintained the
balance of flexible use and fees.
52. This differed from H.R. 3636 which had not required the FCC to limit the initial
eligibility for DTV licenses to existing broadcasters. See H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at
116 (1995).
53. This also represented a change from H.R. 3636.
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amendment with modifications.54 It retained the requirement in the House
bill that the FCC condition the issuance of a new license on the return, after
some period, of either the original broadcast license or the new license.
However, the conference agreement left to the FCC the determination of
when such licenses would be returned and how to reallocate returned
spectrum. The conference agreement adopted the Senate's position on initial
eligibility, stating that if the FCC decided to issue additional licenses for
DTV services, it should limit the initial eligibility to existing broadcasters.
2. Budget Actions
While deliberations over the telecommunications bills were proceeding
in the House and Senate Commerce Committees, the issue of auctioning
broadcast spectrum took on a higher profile and attracted the attention of
the Budget Committees and the general press. In May 1995, the FCC's
Office of Plans and Policy (OPP) sent a letter to Senator Lieberman (D-
Conn.), responding to some of the Senator's questions about the auction
value of DTV spectrum. OPP valued the DTV spectrum from 11 to 70
billion dollars and the value of the analog channels that would be returned
at the end of the transition to DTV from 20 to 132 billion dollars.5 These
numbers figured prominently in the budget battles of the fall and early
winter as the Chairmen of both Senate and House Budget Committee
recommended DTV fees or auctions for deficit reduction. Specifically, the
House and Senate Budget Committees ordered the Commerce Committees
to come up with 14.3 billion dollars in spectrum revenue over the next
seven years to help meet budget deficit reduction targets. 6 At the same
time, a firestorm erupted in the press about a "spectrum giveaway" to
54. H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 160-61 (1996).
55. See Letter from Robert M. Pepper, Chief, Office of Plans and Policy, to Sen.
Lieberman (May 5, 1995). In estimating the value of the licenses to be issued for DTV and
the value of spectrum that would be returned to the government following full deployment
of DTV, OPP used these proxies: (a) the results of spectrum auctions for other services at
that time and (b) the results of private market transactions involving the transfer of television
broadcasting licenses. As Pepper himself noted in subsequent congressional testimony, the
estimates were necessarily very rough because: (a) the market value of any particular block
of spectrum depends on its scarcity, which is difficult to predict years in advance; (b)
conditions placed on spectrum use by law or regulation will affect spectrum value; (c) the
amount of spectrum made available to potential licensees will affect value; and (d) although
often treated as a commodity, the propagation characteristics of different bands make
different frequencies and different agglomerations of frequencies differentially valuable. See
Management of Radio Spectrum Hearings, supra note 26, at 81-85 (testimony of Robert M.
Pepper, Chief, Office of Plans and Policy, FCC).
56. See Christopher Stem, Congress Looking for Spectrum to Sell, BRDCST & CABLE,
Sept. 4, 1995, at 8.
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broadcasters."
The combination of the deficit-reduction pressure, the lure of large
auction revenues, and the increasing public interest in DTV spectrum
resulted in the passage of a budget reconciliation conference agreement on
November 15, 1995 that addressed DTV. This agreement included a
provision that would have required the FCC to re-evaluate its tentative DTV
transition plan and prohibited the issuance of DTV licenses for at least two
years.5 8 In addition to delaying equipment and broadcasting industry
investments in technology, this agreement would have subjected broadcast-
ers to another budget cycle, with all its deficit-cutting pressure, before any
DTV licenses could be issued. The agreement was ultimately vetoed.
As 1995 drew to a close, two different auction proposals sur-
faced--one to auction the analog spectrum that would be returned to the
Commission and one to auction the DTV spectrum before licenses were
assigned. The Clinton Administration backed the analog spectrum auction.
It also favored an accelerated transition to DTV. The Administration
proposed to auction the analog channels in 2002 (presumably repacked into
contiguous blocks) in advance of their actual availability for other uses and
to require analog stations to vacate these channels by 2005. 59 Broadcasters
attacked this plan as unfriendly to both consumers and broadcasters. They
argued that the plan would require consumers to purchase DTV sets before
their analog sets had worn out and before economies of scale had made
DTV sets affordable to most. In effect, they argued this would constitute an
equipment tax (commonly estimated at about 100 billion dollars). Stations
likewise would suffer if required to shift to DTV without regard to the
number of receivers in the marketplace. If the market were not sufficiently
57. See, e.g., William Safire, Stop the Giveaway, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1996 at A21;
William Safire, The Greatest Auction Ever, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1995, at A25; Karen
Kerrigan, Hijacking the Broadcast Spectrum, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1995, at A17; GOP
Giveaway, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1995, at A26; Karen Kerrigan, Mr. Dole Fights a Big
Giveaway, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1996, at A28; Edmund L. Andrews, Dole Steps up Criticism
of Telecommunications Bill, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1996, at D2.
58. The House-passed version would have required the FCC to use auctions for the
assignment of all spectrum, but the House bill specifically exempted from auctions spectrum
that would be used by broadcasters for advanced television services. The Senate bill
contained similar language protecting broadcast spectrum, but because Sen. Pressler (R-SD)
(then Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee) supported the auction of broadcast
spectrum, the Senate bill was revised to delay the assignment of DTV licenses.
59. See COMM. DAILY, Dec. 4, 1995 at 6-7; see also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONS 352-53 (1996). H.R. 2530,
popularly called the "Coalition Budget," proposed adding the Administration's television
transition plan to the spectrum auction provisions of the Balanced Budget Act passed by the
Congress. The FCC ultimately adopted a plan that was consistent with the administration's
proposal by fixing 2006 as the transition's projected end date.
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saturated, broadcasters concluded, stations would lose viewers as well as the
ability to support the DTV service.60
Representative Bliley (R-Va.), Chairman of the House Commerce
Committee, also attacked this expedited auction of the analog spectrum,
stating that it "would wreak havoc on American television viewers or kill
off digital altogether, before it ever has a chance to get off the ground." He
also charged that an expedited auction, which Senate Majority Leader Dole
(R-Kan.) had endorsed, would result in a 'Tre sale" that would minimize
the government's revenues from the spectrum.6
A proposal similar to the Administration plan was introduced on
January 26, 1996 by Chairman Kasich (R-Ohio) of the House Budget
Committee. H.R. 2903, the Balanced Budget Act of 1995 for Economic
Growth and Fairness, would have required a moratorium on analog licenses
and stipulated that "[l]icensees for new services shall be selected by
competitive bidding" by 2002.62 Notwithstanding this nod to the free
market, the legislation would have restricted use of the channels to some
extent. Specifically, each DTV licensee would be required to provide "at
least one non-subscription television service," and the FCC would be
required to "promulgate regulations to assure the dissemination of converter
boxes or devices necessary to ensure access to digital TV to all households
that desire this access at a reasonable cost.
63
The second type of proposal, backed by Senators Dole, McCain (R-
Ariz.), and others in Congress, was to auction the DTV spectrum as early
as 1997 to the highest bidders, who in turn would be free to use the
spectrum as they liked so long as they offered a minimum amount of digital
broadcast television (not necessarily HDTV) and did not interfere with other
users.6' Broadcasters vigorously opposed the up-front auction proposals,
60. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, ASSAULT ON FREE TELEVISION:
A CALL TO ARMS FOP, TELEVISION BROADCASTERS (1996).
61. Commerce Comm. News Release, Jan. 17, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Legislative File.
62. See H.R. 2903, 104th Cong. § 3002(B) (1996). This bill was similar to one that had
been introduced on Oct. 25, 1995 by Rep. Orton (D-Utah)-H.R. 2530, the Common Sense
Balanced Budget Act of 1995. Section 3103 of that bill, entitled "Auction of Recaptured
Analog Licenses", would have required the Commission not to renew any NTSC license
beyond 2005 or one year after the determination that at least 95% of households in the U.S.
could "receive and display video signals, other than video signals transmitted pursuant to an
analog television license." H.R. 2530, 104th Cong., § 3103(a) (1995). The provision of an
alternative transition deadline made this bill less extreme than the administration's proposal.
The bill further would have required DTV licensees to provide "at least one nonsubscription
video service" for at least five years after analog licenses were revoked. See id. § 3103(d)(2).
63. H.R. 2903, 104th Cong. § 3002(B)(4) (1996).
64. This proposal was often discussed, but never formally introduced until Sen. Dole
floated a proposal on Feb. 14, 1996 to auction the spectrum as part of a debt-limit increase
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although their opposition would grow louder in the months to come. The
Association for Maximum Service Television (MSTV) summarized broad-
casters' position on behalf of the television networks and other broadcasting
organizations in a letter to Senator Lieberman.65 The letter argued that
auctioning the digital channels to all comers and for any uses would not
only be an abdication of the Commission's statutory responsibilities but
also would cripple or doom the important stake the public--all Ameri-
cans-has in a successful and seamless transition of their television
service to digital.66
The letter also outlined critical distinctions between television broadcasting
and other industries as well as the unique requirements of the transition to
DTV. In essence, the arguments set forth in this letter and in other advocacy
pieces were:
(1) The television broadcasting industry must convert to DTV to remain
competitive. Because this conversion will require significant invest-
ments without compensating increases in revenue, local stations will not
be able to afford to bid against telephone companies and other potential
participants in an auction.
(2) An auction would most likely destroy the careful channel planning
that is necessary to pack DTV channels into the existing broadcast
spectrum without creating intolerable interference to the existing
service.
(3) If there are "holes" in the roll-out of DTV--that is, if a substantial
number of localities do not bid for and build DTV stations--the DTV
project may fail as the network of local stations falters and equipment
manufacturers hesitate to mass produce DTV sets.
(4) It would be unfair to require stations to bid for a DTV channel
when they will have to relinquish their existing channel.67
(5) Once the transition to DTV is complete, it will be possible to
auction off more than 100 MHz of spectrum in nationwide contiguous
blocks cleared of any other uses. Such spectrum would be far more
valuable than spectrum auctioned piecemeal before the transition is
complete and the NTSC stations have been shut off.
68
and deficit-reduction package. Dole's plan called for auctioning the unused channels between
2 and 56 that were to be used for DTV. The plan went even further and called for the
auction of channels 57-69, whether used or unused. See CONG. Q., Feb. 17, 1996, at 17.
65. MSTV is a trade association representing more than 300 local broadcast television
stations. Since 1956, it has been the television trade association most involved in spectrum
issues.
66. Letter from Margita White, President, MSTV, to Sen. Lieberman (Sept. 14, 1995).
67. See id.
68. See Edward T. Reilly, MSTV Chairman, Remarks at the MSTV Ninth Annual ATV
Update (Nov. 9, 1995)(on file with author); see also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
BROADCASTERS, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF UP FRONT SPECTRUM AUCTIONS (Sept. 5, 1995);
ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL TELEVISION STATIONS, AUCTIONING ADVANCED TELEVISION
SPECTRUM (Feb. 1996).
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These arguments would carry the day in the deliberations over the 1996 Act
but, because they would not quell the auction fever that had taken hold of
Congress, the arguments would have to be reasserted throughout 1996.
C. The Passage of the 1996 Act
The 1996 Act, with its requirement that broadcasters be able to use the
DTV spectrum flexibly, pay for any ancillary uses, and return a channel at
the end of an undefined transition period, was brought to the floor of the
House for a vote on February 1, 1996. The DTV provisions entered into the
debate when Representatives Watt (D-N.C.) and Frank (D-Mass.) engaged
Representatives Bliley, Fields (R-Tex.), Tauzin, and Dingell on the spectrum
flexibility provisions. Watt expressed his concern that the legislation was
"giving away seventy billion dollars of our assets."69 Frank (who would
vote against the legislation) supported Watt and alleged that the Republican
Party had lost its faith in the free market with respect to the broadcast spec-
tram.7" Bliley responded that "there is no giveaway in this bill. What we
do is loan the spectrum to the broadcasters because they have to simulcast
while they advance this new technology ... [the] seventy billion dollars
[estimate of the auction value of the DTV channels] is pulled out of the
ether somewhere. There are no statistics to back it up."7 Similarly,
Dingell, who had expressed questions of his own during the development
of the legislation, commented that "this is a very regrettable red herring"
raised in the context of the transition from analog to digital technologies.
He pointed out that the loan of spectrum would give the public "the
opportunity to make the changeover in an orderly fashion in a way which
benefits everybody. The taxpayers will gain. There is no giveaway of
anything."72 The House approved the 1996 Act by a vote of 414 to 16.
In the Senate, Senator Dole, who had fastened onto the DTV issue in
late December 1995, threatened to delay a Senate vote on the 1996 Act
until the DTV auction controversy was resolved. Ultimately, Senator Dole
did bring the Act to a vote in the Senate after it had passed in the House,
but only on the condition that the FCC would not assign DTV licenses until
Congress had held hearings on the subject of auctions. In response, all five
FCC Commissioners wrote to the congressional leadership, that they
69. 142 CONG. REc. Hi 166 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Watt).
70. Id. at HI 167 (statement of Rep. Frank). In late July, Frank would introduce an
amendment to appropriations legislation to bar the FCC from issuing DTV licenses. The
House defeated the amendment by a large margin on voice vote. See COMM. DAILY, July
25, 1996, at 3.
71. 142 CONG. REC. Hi 166 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Bliley).
72. d. at H 1167 (statement of Rep. Dingell).
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share the determination of you, Senator Dole and others to protect
American taxpayers.. . . [U]nder current law... the Commission lacks
authority to auction, or charge broadcasters for the use of, the spectrum
that has been identified for the provision of these broadcast services.
... Any award of initial licenses or construction permits for Advanced
Television Services will only be made in compliance with the express
intent of Congress and only pursuant to additional legislation it may
adopt resolving this issue.
7 3
This promise from the FCC effectively suspended the effect of the DTV
provisions of the 1996 Act and allowed Congress to hold hearings on the
management of spectrum in general and DTV spectrum in particular.
The congressional foray into DTV legislation resulted in a small piece
of a large law essentially requiring what had already appeared likely to
result from the ongoing FCC proceeding-that is, that broadcasters would
be permitted to use the DTV spectrum flexibly if, in fact, they were loaned
a DTV channel. In return, broadcasters would be required to return either
their original license or their loaned license after the transition to DTV was
complete. What the legislative process also yielded, which may or may not
have arisen solely from the FCC proceeding, was auction fever.
III. THE AFTERMATH OF THE 1996 ACT
A. Setting the Stage
As 1996 and the second session of the 104th Congress unfolded,
threats to auction DTV spectrum continued. The House and Senate Budget
Committees continued to eye the spectrum for revenue, and the Senate
Budget Committee held one of the first and most important hearings after
the passage of the 1996 Act. Eager to exercise their jurisdiction over
spectrum management and ensure that budgetary policy did not overrun
telecommunications policy, the Commerce Committees of both chambers
also held hearings. In all, five hearings were held between March and June
1996 (three by the Senate Commerce Committee, one by the House
Commerce Committee, and one by the Senate Budget Committee). 74 In
addition to the FCC en banc hearings held in December 1995 and
73. Letter from Chairman Hundt, Commissioners Barrett, Chong, Ness, and Quello to
Reps. Bliley, Gingrich, and Sens. Lott and Pressler (Feb. 1, 1996).
74. Senate Budget Hearings, supra note 29; Management of the Radio Spectrum
Hearings, supra note 29; Spectrum Use and Management: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 104th Cong. (1996); Broadcast Spectrum and
Television Standards: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter Broadcast Spectrum Hearings]; Federal
Government Use and Management of Spectrum: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 104th Cong. (1996).
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March 1996 on related issues, 75 these congressional hearings permitted
broadcasters the first full opportunity to make their case against spectrum
auctions-a complex case that focused on the nature of the DTV system
and the broadcasting industry. The congressional hearings also plunged
legislators into the intricacies of spectrum management for which many,
particularly in the Budget Committees, were unprepared and lacked
expertise. Debate over the value of broadcast spectrum became, in part, a
debate over the proper place of the FCC and the appropriate division of
power between the FCC and Congress in assigning telecommunications
licenses.
The appeal of spectrum auctions was clear and, at first blush, the
prospect of auctioning spectrum for DTV seemed as sensible as auctioning
spectrum for PCS. Broadcasters faced the challenge of explaining how
advertising-supported and locally based over-the-air television service
differed from the subscription services that had previously been auctioned
and how DTV was a service upgrade rather than a new service capable of
generating new revenue.76 As arguments for and against broadcast
spectrum auctions developed, an interesting thing happened: the focus on
ancillary and supplementary services that had motivated congressional
action on DTV service in the first place dissolved. Auction opponents,
particularly broadcasters and consumer equipment manufacturers, refocused
the discussion on broadcast television's traditional functions-namely, on
free and universal television service. At the same time, auction proponents
ceased to focus on the additional revenue DTV might bring by way of
subscription services and instead simply highlighted the amount of money
that could be gained by auctioning spectrum in the short term.
75. En Banc Hearing on Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the
Existing Television Broadcast Service Before the Federal Communications Commission in
MM Dkt. No. 87-268 (Dec. 12, 1995) [hereinafter FCCATVHearing]; En Banc Hearing on
Spectrum Policy Before the Federal Communications Commission (Mar. 5, 1996) [herein-
after FCC Spectrum Policy Hearing].
76. Sen. John Breaux (D-La.) attempted to define the difference between broadcasting
and other services:
Other industries that use the spectrum can share a fee for their services. Cable
does. Cellular companies do. Satellite companies do. So do cab companies and
utilities.... Television stations don't do that and can't do that. They must absorb
the higher costs of doing business or try to pass those costs along to their
advertisers. But the costs we're talking about with up-front auctions are too large
to be absorbed or to pass along. And those other industries don't have the
obligation that broadcasters do to operate in the "public interest, necessity and
convenience"--a compact between government and broadcasters that dates back
to the Communications Act of 1934.
Sen. John Breaux, Don't Sell Spectrum by Selling Out Broadcasters, ROLL CALL, Mar. 11,
1996.
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During the deliberations over the 1996 Act and prior to the first
congressional hearings on DTV spectrum, broadcasters increased their
commitment to HDTV as they returned to first principles in seeking to
make Congress and the public understand what was at stake. The first
public forum in which representatives of the broadcast industry as a whole
affirmed this commitment was another FCC rulemaking begun in August
1995."7 Responding in November 1995 to a request for comments on how
the DTV channel should be used, a group of more than 100 broadcasters,
including all the major networks and trade associations, deemphasized ancil-
lary and supplementary services, stressed the importance of HDTV and their
support of the transition plan contemplated by the then-pending legisla-
tion.78 Equipment manufacturers and others agreed.79
Broadcasters amplified this commitment to HDTV in the FCC's En
Banc Hearing on DTV implementation held in December 1995, while the
1996 Act was stalled in conference. Witnesses articulated three basic points
that would be elaborated in the congressional hearings to follow: (1) that
the very survival of broadcast television as a viable competitor to cable and
77. See ATV Fourth Further Notice, 10 FCC Rcd. 10,540 (1995). In April 1995, the
MSTV Board publicized a resolution that HDTV, rather than ancillary and supplementary
services, was the first priority of their membership of more than 300 local stations:
The MSTV Board reaffirms its goal and commitment to broadcast high definition
television ... [including] a reasonable minimum amount of [HDTV], as
determined by FCC rules. The goal of public policy and of the local television
station community should be to transition as rapidly as feasible and practical,
consistent with the unique nature of each market and the needs of our communi-
ties, our nation's free and universal television broadcast system to the digital era.
See BRINKLEY, supra note 7, at 342.
78. See Broadcasters' Joint Comments to the ATV Fourth Further Notice in MM Dkt.
No. 87-268, at 15-18 (Nov. 20, 1995); see also Comments of CBS, Inc. to the ATVFourth
Further Notice in MM Dkt. No. 87-268, at 7-8 (Nov. 20, 1995); Comments of Capital Cit-
ies/ABC, Inc. to the ATV Fourth Further Notice in MM Dkt. No. 87-268, at 7 (Nov. 20,
1995); Comments of Golden Orange Broadcasting to the ATVFourth Further Notice in MM
Dkt. No. 87-268, at 2 (Nov. 20, 1995); Comments of National Broadcasting Company to the
ATV Fourth Further Notice in MM Dkt. No. 87-268, at 7-8 (Nov. 20, 1995); Comments of
New World Television, Inc. to the ATV Fourth Further Notice in MM Dkt. No. 87-268, at
11-15 (Nov. 20, 1995); Comments of the Association of America's Public Television
Stations and the Public Broadcasting Service on the ATVFourth Further Notice in MM Dkt.
No. 87-268, at 18 (Nov. 20, 1995); Comments of the National Association of Broadcasters,
in the ATV Fourth Further Notice in MM Dkt. No. 87-268, at 3-4 (Nov. 20, 1995).
79. See, e.g., Comments of the Electronic Industries Association and the Advanced
Television Committee to the ATV Fourth Further Notice in MM Dkt. No. 87-268, at 4-5
(Nov. 20, 1995); Comments of the Digital HDTV Grand Alliance to the ATVFourth Further
Notice in MM Dkt. No. 87-268, at 4-5 (Nov. 20, 1995); Comments of the General
Instrument Corp. to the ATV Fourth Further Notice in MM Dkt. No. 87-268, at 5-6 (Nov.
20, 1995); Comments of Thomson Consumer Electronics, Inc. to the ATV Fourth Further
Notice in MM Dkt. No. 87-268, at 4 (Nov. 20, 1995); Comments of Zenith Electronics Corp.
to the A TV Fourth Further Notice in MM Dkt. No. 87-268, at 2-3 (Nov. 20, 1995).
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other video services depended on television transmission of higher quality
digital pictures; (2) that HDTV, not ancillary and supplementary services,
would be the engine of DTV; and (3) that most broadcasters would have to
struggle to afford the transition and would not be able to compete in an
auction.
For example, the general counsel of ABC testified that the transition
to DTV was a matter of life or death for the broadcast service and that
HDTV must be central to that service:
Free over-the-air broadcasting will wither if it is forced to meet...
competition through technologically stale NTSC offerings. And the
public interest is hardly enhanced by limiting these digital break-
throughs to only the video-by-subscription world. At a time when we
as a country are legitimately concerned about creating information
have's and have not's, it simply makes no sense to deprive broadcasters
of the means of providing the public an opportunity to have such
enhanced video offerings available at no charge.... [W]e believe that
the Commission should establish.., a minimum HIDTV requirement
... to assure that HDTV receives a fair test in the marketplace and to
shorten the transition so that one channel can be returned as promptly
as possible for other uses."0
The president of the NBC Television Network, Neil Braun, echoed
these points and emphasized that the very existence of the television system
was at stake. If broadcast television were not permitted to upgrade so as to
be able to compete with cable on a level playing field, the value that
television adds (including the ability to launch programs later shown on
cable, to launch new products and to enhance competition) would be lost.
Lost too would be the unique characteristics of "[1]ocal and network
broadcast television [which] remains this nation's great unifier--the one
medium that provides the same high quality news, entertainment and sports
programming to both the haves and the have nots--the most widely shared
experience of our society."81 Braun also deemphasized the new nonbroad-
cast services that the DTV channel might provide:
Ancillary and supplementary digital broadcasting services will be
important, incremental businesses, but they are unlikely to compare to
our foundation-free over-the-air broadcasting. No matter how much
flexibility Congress and the FCC give broadcasters to use digital
technology for new ancillary and supplementary services, there is no
way businesses like datacasting or paging will ever compare-in terms
80. Prepared Remarks of Alan Braverman, ABC, Inc., Before the FCC ATVHearing in
MM Dkt. No. 87-268 (Dec. 12, 1995).
81. Written Testimony of Neil Braun, NBC Television Network, Before the FCC ATV
Hearing in MM Dkt No. 87-268 (Dec. 12, 1995).
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of scale and revenue potential-to the core broadcasting business.82
Speaking especially on behalf of smaller broadcasters, the chairman of
the National Association of Broadcasters' Television Board, made the point
that profit margins for stations operating outside the top ten markets are
dramatically smaller than those of stations in larger markets. For the smaller
stations, the conversion costs of 2 million dollars (for the ability to pass
through a network signal) to 10 million dollars (for the ability to originate
HDTV programming) would be overwhelming. 3 Auctions on top of this
would effectively put these broadcasters out of business.84
B. The Congressional Hearings
These were the arguments that broadcasters and their allies in the
equipment manufacturing industry would develop in the spring congressio-
nal hearings called for by Senator Dole. The first hearing, held by the
Senate Budget Committee on March 14, 1996, was critical in framing both
the economic debate over the value of the broadcast spectrum and the
debate over the extent to which the public's interest in a functioning
broadcast system outweighs the public interest in immediate auction reve-
nues.
Economists disputed how much revenue the various broadcast
spectrum auction proposals, now refined from what they had been earlier
in the year, would yield. The first option, the "digital auction" proposal,
was to auction the DTV channels as early as 1997.8 The most obvious
advantage of this option was its relative certainty and proximity. However,
because the DTV channels were interspersed with NTSC channels and
82. Id.
83. See Written Testimony of Ralph Gabbard, NAB, Before the FCC ATV Hearing in
MM Dkt No. 87-268 (Dec. 12, 1995). Gabbard testified that smaller market stations (that
is, markets 61-70) average 11.2% the profit of stations in the top ten markets. In even
smaller markets (that is, markets 151-175), the profits fall to 2.7% that of the larger markets.
The average profit margins for all stations in the smallest group between 1991 and 1994 was
not enough to finance DTV costs even using all annual profits, let alone enough money to
pay for DTV spectrum at auction.
84. The issue of the effect of auctions on television service to rural areas was of
particular concern in the hearings. Sen. Rockefeller (D-W.Va.) noted his concern that, just
as airline deregulation had emptied many rural states of jet service, so spectrum auctions
might make it unprofitable to operate television stations in places like West Virginia. See
Federal Communications Commission Oversight and Implementation of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 104th Cong. 32 (1996) (Remarks of Sen. Rockefeller).
85. A wrinkle in this proposal was that the channels be used for DTV rather than any
use, but that they be auctioned to broadcasters and potential broadcasters. This restriction
on the use of the spectrum depressed the valuation of it from the high early estimates of 70
billion dollars.
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because different frequency bands would be available in each market, the
value of the DTV channels might not be as high as spectrum that was
uniformly available throughout the country and "zoned" for new services.
Although never proposed in legislation, various economists evaluated this
proposal as it had been reported in the press and other fora.
The second option, the early "analog auction" proposal, added to the
Coalition Budget (H.R. 2530) in December 1995 and endorsed by the
Administration, was to accelerate the auction of NTSC channels to 2002
(rather than when the transition was complete) and the cessation of NTSC
service to 2005 (rather than the FCC's proposed fifteen years). In addition,
broadcasters would be required to pay any difference between the estimated
(17 billion dollars) and actual amounts the analog spectrum earned. The
advantages of this option were that it might make available clear, contigu-
ous blocks of spectrum because the DTV channels could be repacked into
a tighter block after the transition was complete (and the channels that had
been auctioned actually became available). On the other hand, an auction
of spectrum that would not become available for years to come would be
riddled with uncertainties. Broadcasters argued that the accelerated timetable
was impractical and would jeopardize the transition.
The third option, the "FCC's original proposal," had the advantage of
promising clear, contiguous blocks of spectrum without the uncertainties or
unrealistic acceleration of the administration's proposal. According to
broadcasters and equipment manufacturers, the original plan was also the
most likely to protect the existing television service from destructive inter-
ference-a benefit of substantial value.86 Unfortunately, the prospect of
waiting fifteen years for revenue was untenable to many lawmakers.
In the first hearing before the Senate Budget Committee, an economist
from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the value of the
86. MIT Professor Jerry Hausman, in the Joint Broadcasters Comments to the ATVSixth
Further Notice (Nov. 20, 1996) (Appendix Dl: Statement of Jerry A. Hausman) [hereinafter
Hausman Report], attempted to estimate the value of the broadcast service to the consumer.
He did this in the context of the ATVSixth Further Notice's proposal to make DTV channels
in the 60-69 range available for an early auction. Using Channel 38 in Boston (a UPN
station) as an example, he estimated that the loss in consumer value is between 3.5 and 4.7
times higher than the revenue that the FCC would raise in an early auction of the spectrum
on which Channel 38's DTV channel would be located. The Hausman Report compared the
estimated value of an early auction of the DTV "holes" in channels 60-69 with an auction
of the entire band after the transition. By extrapolating from PCS auctions, he found that the
market places a significantly higher value on the larger blocks of contiguous spectrum. He
estimated that the proposal to delay the auctions for channels 60-69 would lead to 2.3 to
10.6 times greater revenue because of the ability to sell large spectrum blocks after the
transition was complete.
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digital auction proposal at 12.5 billion dollars 7 and the value of the early
analog auction proposal at 11 billion dollars--the floor of the 11 to 70
billion dollar estimate first made by the FCC's Office of Plans and Policy.
Illustrating the difficulty of coming up with reliable estimates, the CBO had
initially estimated the analog auction proposal at 6 billion dollars, and the
Administration's Office of Management Budget (OMB) had estimated it at
13 billion dollars, which the OMB later raised to 17 billion dollars.
However, according to the CBO testimony, "In the uncertain world of
auction receipts seven years in the future, one should view CBO's and
OMB's estimates as being close together rather than far apart."88 An MIT
economics professor, specializing in econometric modelling, called the CBO
estimate for the analog auction proposal much too low and the OMB
estimate too high. He opined that an auction of the analog channels would
earn more, even taking into account the lapse of time, than would the
auction of the digital channels.8 9
What the sparring economists did not estimate was the difference
between the analog auction proposal and the FCC's original proposal which
would make the same spectrum available, but only after the transition to
DTV was complete. The task of explaining the difference between these
two proposals (as well as attacking the digital auction proposal on policy
grounds) fell mainly to broadcasters and their allies. These proponents of
the original FCC proposal attempted to show what the transition would
require and why rushing the transition before the mass of broadcasters could
be expected to transmit DTV and the mass of consumers would receive it
would lose more in television service than was gained.
Broadcasters began to make these points at the same Senate Budget
hearing at which the economists testified and then hammered the point
home over the next three months.9" The technical challenges of doubling
87. See Senate Budget Hearings, supra note 29 (Mar. 14, 1996) (testimony of David H.
Moore, Senior Analyst, Natural Resources and Commerce Division, Congressional Budget
Office).
88. Id.
89. See id. (Mar. 13, 1996) (testimony of Jerry Hausman, MacDonald Professor of
Economics, MIT), available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 134424.
90. See id. (Mar. 14, 1996) (testimony of Mike Burgess, KOB-TV, Albuquerque, and
Howard Shrier, Nebraska Broadcasters Association), available in Westlaw, 1996 WL
145644; Management of Radio Spectrum Hearings, supra note 29 (testimonies of Alfred C.
Sikes, President, Hearst News Media and Technology; Warren P. Williamson, WKBN
Broadcasting Corporation; Kevin O'Brien, KTVU-TV, San Francisco; Ray Rodriguez,
Univision Television Network; David Griffin, KWTV, Oklahoma City; Patrick M. Scott,
Fisher Broadcasting, Inc.; Robert Allen, KRCG-TV and Iowa Broadcasters Association,
Cedar Rapids; Elizabeth Murphy Bums, Morgan-Murphy Stations); Broadcast Spectrum
Hearings, supra note 74 (testimonies of Ray Rodriguez, Univision; Robert C. Wright,
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the number of television stations while minimizing increased interference
to the picture was daunting. Even more daunting for the broadcast industry
was the prospect of investing as much as 10 million dollars for each new
local station before sets were widely available to receive the new signals.
Station managers and group executives testified that even to make the
rudimentary investments required to pass through a network DTV signal
could require an annual payment of nearly half-a-million dollars. Stations
would need to convince their lenders to make the loans even though the
stations would see no new revenue from converting to digital. The digital
auction proposal would deter many broadcasters from bidding and could
jeopardize the service altogether. The analog auction proposal, with its
arbitrary deadline for completing the transition, would add to the financial
pressures stations faced and endanger the transition. According to one
broadcaster, "[tihe losers in that equation are the consumers, who lose
access to the benefits of digital technology."9
Senator Breaux took to heart broadcasters' message when he
concluded that whatever the attractions of auction revenues, the potential
risks to the television service and the successful introduction of DTV was
not worth it. He wrote:
[T]his whole venture [is] highly complex, fraught with technical and
economic implications .... Spectrum auctions will definitely generate
immediate government revenues, but if we're not careful, they will also
produce negative consequences that far outweigh the immediate
economic benefits. They may end up costing American taxpayers and
consumers far more than the spectrum is worth right now. We don't
know enough to predict adequately what will happen. We don't know
whether immediate uses of the new spectrum will interfere with
existing channels, whether public safety services will be compromised,
whether national channels will be possible, or whether development of
new spectrum-based equipment will be impeded.92
By the last hearing, held by the House Commerce Committee on June
20, 1996, it appeared that the congressional leadership had concluded either
that broadcast spectrum was more valuable at auction later than sooner, or
that the transition to DTV was too important and fragile to hazard spectrum
auctions, or both. In any case, Congress decided to leave the choice of
methodology for assigning DTV channels and for governing the transition
to DTV, at least for the time being, to the FCC. Thus, in a letter to the
National Broadcasting Company; James M. Keelor, Cosmos Broadcasting Corp.; William
Sullivan, CPAX-TV, Missoula).
91. See Senate Budget Hearings, supra note 29 (testimony of Mike Burgess, KOB-TV,
Albuquerque and Howard Shrier, Nebraska Broadcasters Association) (Mar. 14, 1996),
available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 145644.
92. Breaux, supra note 76.
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FCC, the congressional leadership wrote that they
recommend that the Commission complete all actions necessary to
prescribe rules to permit the deployment of over-the-air digital
broadcasting no later than April 1, 1997 .... [W]e would note that the
Commission does not need any additional statutory authority to proceed
with the assignment of digital licenses. We would, therefore, expect the
Commission to proceed with bringing this exciting new technology to
the American people without further delay.93
IV. CONCLUSION
With Congress's blessing to proceed with the assignment of DTV
licenses, the FCC went on to issue two more notices of proposed rulemak-
ing and to begin to wrap-up the long-pending DTV proceeding.94 Notwith-
standing two-and-a-half years of congressional deliberation and at least five
congressional hearings, the DTV regulatory process travelled much the same
course it likely would have travelled without any legislative interven-
tion-with one significant exception. The eagerness to recover spectrum
would make the transition time shorter and DTV channels more tightly
packed. In August 1996, in part as a result of the interest in auctions and
spectrum management aroused by the 1996 Act, the FCC proposed a plan
to concentrate DTV channel assignments between channels seven and fifty-
one so as to free up spectrum (in particular, channels 60-69) for early
auctions and embark on the process of repacking broadcast channels. 95
This is known as the "core-channel concept." Although the FCC had always
stated its intention to assign DTV channels efficiently, it is likely that the
core-channel concept was a direct result of the stir in late 1995 and early
1996 over broadcast spectrum auctions. By order of April 3, the FCC at
93. Letter from Reps. Gingrich, Bliley, and Dingell and Sens. Lott and Hollings, to
Chairman Hundt (June 19, 1996).
94. See ATV Fifth Further Notice, 11 FCC Red. 6235, paras. 8-16; ATV Sixth Further
Notice, 11 FCC Red. 10,968, paras. 2-4; ATV Fourth Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd.
17,771, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 963 (1996). On April 3, 1997, the FCC also adopted rules
to be reported in the Fifth and Sixth Reports and Orders. As of this writing, these writings
had not yet been released. See DTV Rules, supra note 4.
95. See ATV Sixth Further Notice, II FCC Rcd. 10,968, paras. 21-37. Broadcasters
opposed this option in their comments to the FCC on the grounds that such a concentration
would increase the interference to the existing NTSC service, reduce DTV service, reduce
much-needed flexibility throughout the transition, pre-judge the question of what spectrum
band is optimal for DTV, and lead to an early auction of spectrum that could be reallocated
more efficiently after the transition to DTV was complete. See Hausman Report, supra note
86, at 24-42. The FCC ultimately did assign DTV stations to channels 2-6 without reserva-
tion but, as a result of the heightened attention to the value of spectrum and competing
users, marked some channels in 60-69 for a reallocation to public safety communications
services and for auction before the transition to DTV is complete. See DTV Rules, supra
note 4; DTVAllotments, supra note 4.
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long last assigned DTV channels to broadcasters.96
Perhaps the larger importance of the 1996 Act's DTV provisions and
the controversy they provoked lies in the attention directed at spectrum
management. Two camps appear to have developed. One camp, supported
by Senator McCain, now Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee,
views spectrum largely as a commodity that generally should be assigned
by auction.97 To the extent that spectrum is a fungible commodity, the
expert management of the FCC becomes less important. Thus, proponents
of this view also tend to support the downsizing of the FCC.98 Despite the
threat that auctions pose to the FCC's relevance, two FCC staff members
released a paper in January 1997 entitled "Using Market-Based Spectrum
Policy to Promote the Public Interest." 99 This paper, although acknowledg-
ing that market forces do not always produce the optimal public goods,
argued for the use of explicit monetary subsidies rather than spectrum
assignment procedures and service rules, to meet public interest goals. The
paper urged the FCC to treat spectrum like a commodity and to allow
licensees to use spectrum flexibility in terms of the service they provide, the
technical modes they use, the channel size and geographic location in which
they operate and the pace at which they build out their systems. In other
words, previously encumbered rights to spectrum should become essentially
interests free and clear of all obligations.
The second camp views spectrum as a resource that must be allocated
to different services according to strict technical criteria and assigned,
sometimes by auction and sometimes by other means, according to the
nature and requirements of the different services. This camp emphasizes the
96. See DTV Rules, supra note 4; DTV Allotments, supra note 4. Even up to the last
minute, there were calls to auction the digital channels. See, e.g., Bob Dole, Giving Away
the Airwaves, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1997, at A29.
97. Sen. McCain, in a January 9, 1997 letter to Chairman Hundt, said that he intended
to introduce legislation to authorize the FCC to auction spectrum for broadcast licenses and
asked that the FCC "take no action on new rules" for DTV licensing until Congress votes
on any such legislation. See COMM DAILY, Jan. 10, 1996 at 9; see also McCain Favors
Auctions of Analog TV Licenses, BRDCST & CABLE, Jan. 13, 1997, at 3. Sen. McCain did
in fact introduce legislation that would have permitted the FCC to move ahead on DTV, but
would have required that certain DTV channels be auctioned. See Public Safety Act, S. 255,
105th Cong. (1997).
98. See e.g., ADAM D. THmERER, A POLICY MAKER'S GUIDE TO DEREGULATING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS PART 5: Is THE FCC WORTH ITS COST? (Heritage Foundation, Mar.
22, 1995).
99. GREGORY L. ROSSTON & JEFFREY S. STEINBERG, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, USING MARKET-BASED SPECTRUM POLICY TO PROMOTE THE PUBLIC INTEREST
(Jan. 1997).
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FCC's role in the assignment process.' ° Although these views may never
again be as prominent as in the DTV debates, there is a growing skepticism
about auctions and a belief that auctions may not be the most appropriate
spectrum management tool in many contexts.
This skepticism was evident at the 105th Congress' first oversight
hearing on spectrum management held by the House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection (February 12, 1997).
The skepticism was prompted by two developments. First, there was a letter
from the chief of the FCC Wireless Telecommunications Bureau to Senator
Hollings urging Congress to reconsider its previous mandate, contained in
Section 3001 of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act for 1997,
that the FCC auction spectrum in the 2305-2320 and 2345-2360 MHz bands
for wireless services by April 15, 1997.0' Specifically, the letter indicated
that a number of factors might act to depress the auction value of the
spectrum, including interference constraints that would limit the use of the
auctioned spectrum and a lack of readiness in the telecommunications and
financial communities. Second, the Clinton Administration released its
budget, again proposing an accelerated auction of the analog television
channels and requiring that broadcasters pay the difference between
expected and actual auction revenues. 2 Only this time, it was rumored
that the Congressional Budget Office thought the auction revenue predic-
tions exaggerated. Sure enough, after the hearing, the CBO reported that
it estimated the analog auction revenues to be about 5.4 billion dollars, not
the 14.8 billion dollars that the administration predicted. 3 At the over-
sight hearing, Chairman Tauzin in particular questioned whether spectrum
auctions were always the best policy when they risked dumping spectrum
on the market too cheaply. And how could the government hold licensees
100. See, e.g., FCC Spectrum Policy Hearing, supra note 75 (written testimony of
Jonathan D. Blake for MSTV). This testimony argued that FCC spectrum allocations need
to take into account distinctions between existing and new services, open systems (meaning
a single operator lacks control of both the transmitting and receiving ends of a system) and
closed systems, free and subscription services, and incompatible and compatible services. In
addition, it made the point that market mechanisms to assign spectrum licenses are suitable
only in certain situations, for example, in the assignment of new subscription services in
which the integrity of existing services is not compromised, elusive disruption costs to the
public are minimal or recoverable, and the market works as a proxy for the public interest.
101. See Letter of Michele C. Farquhar, Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, to
Sen. Hollings (Feb. 5, 1997).
102. See Testimony of Larry Irving, Asst. Secretary for Communications and Information,
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration,
Before the House Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade,
and Consumer Protection (Feb. 12, 1997), available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 60500.
103. See Budget Bulletin, Senate Commerce Majority Staff, 105th Cong., No. 9 (March
24, 1997), also available at <http://www.senate.gov/comm/budget/releases/bulletin.htm>.
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responsible for the government's predictions of revenue when those
predictions were so fallible?"°
The DTV transition will now play out at the FCC and around the
United States as broadcasters apply for the channels that have been reserved
for them and actually build DTV facilities. The 1996 Act's DTV provisions
will have little to do with the success or character of the DTV service. But
the fracas in Congress over DTV will have lasting impact. One of the
results of the DTV controversy is that Congress is apparently more eager
to exercise its oversight functions with respect to the FCC on spectrum
issues so that the public interest in both service and auction revenues are
taken into account as are the specific, often very technical, characteristics
of each of the varied services now competing for spectrum.
On April 1, two days before the FCC adopted a DTV channel
allocation scheme and service rules, Senator McCain announced that he
would introduce a bill to bring order to the FCC's auction process. The
spotlight that the DTV provisions of the 1996 Act focused on the FCC's
spectrum management process will continue to shine once DTV leaves
center stage. The tug between the drive to auction spectrum and the need
to husband it without regard to auction revenues will persist.
104. See Remarks of Rep. Tauzin, Transcript of the Hearing Before the House Committee
on Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection (Feb.
12, 1997) available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 63078 ("The real true value [of spectrum] is what
people in the marketplace actually offer for an actual bid at an actual auction. Why then can
you conclude that well, because the real value turned out to be something less than CBO
guessed, somebody else has to make it up? Isn't that a budgetary decision than a policy one?
.. [I]sn't that really driven by the need to find some money somewhere so you don't have
to cut spending or raise taxes on the general public?").
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